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THE LONG AND THE SHORT OF IT: 
ARE EMPLOYER GROOMING CODES DISCRIMINATORY? 
By 
Dr. Sharlene A. McEvoy* 
As the country becomes more diverse, employers have seen more 
variations in personal appearance that may clash with the corporate culture. This 
paper will analyze a recent Connecticut case in which an employee claimed a 
discriminatory dismissal based on an unequal application of the company's dress 
code. 
INTRODUCTION 
As the country becomes more diverse and individuals exercise their 
personal freedom, the workplace has seen a diversity of appearance and 
clothing styles. The "Man in the Gray Flannel Suit," a 1950's stereotype of 
business dress no longer applies as the workforce dresses more casually. 
Can an employer fire an employee for wearing clothing the employer 
deems inappropriate, or can an employer dismiss a male employee for wearing 
long hair when other female employees can wear such a hairstyle? 
Both of these issues were addressed in a recent Connecticut case, Hart v. 
Knights of Columbus' which arose under Connecticut's Fair Employment 
Practices Act/ the state counterpart of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. Such workplace issues are sure to recur in future cases as more and more 
employees claim that they are victims of such discrimination. 
Robert Hart was a male college graduate holding a B.A. degree in 
Business Management, who sued his employer, the Knights of Columbus, a 
New Haven based religious organization. Hart was hired as a file clerk on 
November 10, 1996 and a few months later ran afoul of the Knights' dress 
code which provided in part that: 
"Dressy shorts or shorts of reasonable lengths may be acceptable 
only if they are part of a total outfit that presents a professional 
business-like appearance. "3 
*Professor of Business Law, Fairfield University, Fairfield, Connecticut 
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On June 11 1997 Hart wore shorts to work. As a result of his fashion 
choice the Dir:ctor of Human Resources Thomas Lynch called him into his 
office in front of at least one other person ordered Hart to stand on a chair 
so that he (Lynch) could look at Hart's legs. Lynch then concluded that Hart's 
shorts were "not appropriate business attire."4 And further stated "We would 
never want somebody like you to represent our company." Lynch also asked 
Hart the name of the College he had attended so "We don't donate any money 
to them."s Lynch conceded that if Hart were a woman there would be no 
problem with wearing the shorts. 
The next day, June 12, 1997, when Hart wore shorts to work, Lynch 
summoned Hart to his office and informed him that shorts were "not appropnate 
for men" and suspended him for the day without pay.6 
Hart brought suit claiming that he was constructively discharged and 
forced to seek another job. Hart claimed that the Knights of Columbus 
enforcement of its written dress policy discriminated against him based on 
gender.7 He argued that the defendant had a written dress policy that permitted 
the wearing of shorts but that he was not allowed to wear them because he was 
a man and not a woman. 
DISCRIMINATION CLAIM 
Hart brought his action under the State's Fair Employment 
As interpreted in another Connecticut case, Pik Wik Stores, Inc. v. Commzsszon 
on Human Rights and Opportunities,8 the purpose of 31-126a of the 
Connecticut Law is to prohibit employer discrimination based on such 
immutable characteristics as race, color, national origin or sex. 
In the Pik Wik case, the issue was the chain's grooming policy, which 
required male employees to have "neat well groomed hair, off the collar and 
above the ears", but these restrictions did not affect female employees.9 
An applicant for the job with the chain refused to. 
grooming policy and was not hired prompting him to file a discnmmation swt. 
The Court found that a hiring policy which applies to issues such as 
grooming codes or hair length was related to an :mployer' s about how 
to run a business rather than to equal opportunity. The Pzk Wzk Court stated 
that the plaintiff was denied a job as a result of a conscious choice not to cut 
his hair and not because of his sex.10 
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Then both the Courts in Pik Wik and in the Knights of Columbus cases 
could fmd no discrimination based on an immutable characteristic. 11 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Hart alleged that the Knights of Columbus breached its written contract 
with him by not allowing him to wear shorts as authorized in the written dress 
code. The court found that a written policy can some time give way to an 
expressed or implied contract between the employer and employee but in this 
case the employer, Knights of Columbus had clarified the fact that its policy 
did not apply to both its male and female employees. Hart thus failed in the 
cause of action.12 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS 
Hart alleged both the intentional and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress in his complaint against the Knights of Columbus. 
Under Connecticut cases, 13 four elements must be established before the 
plaintiff can prevail on a claim of an intentional infliction of emotional 
distress: 
1. That the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress or that 
he knew or should have known that emotional distress was 
likely to result. 
2. That the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous. 
3. That the defendant's conduct was the cause of Hart's distress. 
4. That the plaintiff sustained severe emotional distress. 
The Knights of Columbus denied that its conduct with respect to enforcement 
of the dress code was outrageous.14 In general, the tort of the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress will lie only when the defendant's conduct: 
"Exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, 
of a nature which is especially calculated to cause and 
does cause mental distress of a serious kind."1s 
The Court believed that the conduct of Director of Human Resources 
Lynch fell far short of that standard even if it could be it could be considered 
"reprehensible. "16 
The Court also found Hart's claim of the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress failed because under Connecticut case law17 the tort will not 
lie unless there is a termination of employment. As Hart was not fired by the 
Knights -- he resigned - the claim failed. Hart countered that he was the 
victim of a constructive. discharge and so the requirement of"termination" was 
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satisfied but the Court disagreed that Hart's resignation was a constructive 
discharge. A constructive discharge means that an employer has made the 
employee's working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person in the 
latter's shoes would feel compelled to resign. 18 The Court did not find that the 
Knights' made Hart's working conditions so difficult that he was forced to 
leave his job. 
Thus Hart's complaint failed on four theories: the state's anti-
discrimination law, breach of implied contract and the intentional and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
OTHER CASES 
Based on the outcome of the Hart case it would appear that employees 
will have little leverage in challenging what they regard as unfair enforcement 
of a company dress code. 
Frank J. Kleinsorge, an optometrist filed suit in U.S. District Court in 
November 1999 contending that he was fired from Eyeland Optical Center in 
Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania because he wore an earring in his ear. He worked 
at Eyeland for two months before being fired in April, 1999. Kleinsorge's 
lawyer noted that his client was wearing an earring when he was interviewed 
for the job and no one advised him that it was inappropriate. The owner of 
Eyeland, later informed Kleinsorge that he could not wear the earring which 
his lawyer insisted was a "style choice" that Kleinsorge made. As his lawyer 
stated, "It's the way he wants to look."19 
The Kleinsorge case differs from Hart's in two important ways. First, 
Kleinsorge was fired by his employer while Hart resigned his job. Second, 
Kleinsorge wore the earring during the job interview so his potential employer 
had ample warning that Kleinsorge sported an earring that violated company 
rules. Clearly Hart wore shorts only after he was employed. 
Both cases have in common the claim that if Hart and Kleinsorge were 
females they would be free to wear the shorts and the earring in the work place 
prompting both to claim that they were victims of gender discrimination. If the 
notion of "immutable characteristic" is applied to the Kleinsorge case, his suit 
will be unsuccessful because he can change his appearance by removing the 
earring. It appears that Eyeland's anti-earring policy is a matter of choice and 
not a denial of equal opportunity. 
While the wearing of earrings has become a more prevalent style for men 
in recent years; so too has the wearing of tattoos by women as well as the 
fashion of body piercing by both sexes. 
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Can an employer lawfully discharge an employee who is adorned with 
visible tatoos or pierced body parts? As a result of the Hart case the answer 
to "yes." can impose appearance codes it is within 
their discretion to decide how their businesses should be run and what kind of 
appearance their employees should present as their representatives. Can an 
decline to hire or dismiss a tattooed female employee while declining to 
dismiss a tattooed male Again the answer would appear to be "yes." 
The female employee might argue that the presence of tattoos is an "immutable 
characteristic" but the courts would not likely accept the immutability of a tattoo 
as to the of race, color, national origin or sex. Indeed, 
acqwsition of a tattoo IS a voluntary undertaking while the latter qualities are 
things that are beyond the control of the employee. 
CONCLUSION 
change and fads come and go, employers are sure to be 
faced With decisions regarding employees whose physical appearance differs 
from the employer's idea. In the 1800s, pierced earrings were popular but 
out of style in the early 1900s.20 Pierced ears were once regarded as a 
that. someone _was part of a lower socio-economic class. In the 
Iconoclastic 1960s, pierced ears for women made a comeback and in the 1990s 
the piercing of one ear and wearing of earrings became a male fad. Now many 
men and women have multiple piercings on the ears as well as eyebrows, lips, 
t?ngues and navels. Tattoos, once associated with naval service, were also a 
nte of passage for men. They too were considered a mark of lower class status 
but today, tattoos are ubiquitous on both young males and females of all 
classes.21 
the such fashion trends, it does not appear that the 
Will allow discrurunat10n laws to protect such fads in contravention of 
allowmg an employer the discretion to dictate how a member of his/her 
workforce present themselves to the public. 
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ELEC1RONIC CONTRACTS: ARE THEY ENFORCEABLE? 
by 
Diana D'Amico Juettner* and Roy J. Girasa 
Introduction 
The use of the Internet by consumers has increased dramatically since 1995. In 
June of 1995, there were less than 1.5 million users; however, one year later the number 
of users had grown to 20 million. The increase in the number of users has contributed to 
the growth of business to consumer sales on the Internet. By 1998, approximately 10 
million households purchased a product online and the volume of sales was around $66.4 
billion. The volume of sales for 1999 has been estimated at $66.4 billion with sales 
reaching $177.7 billion by 2003.1 This phenomenon has propelled the use of electronic 
contracts by those who provide computer-generated goods and services to those who wish 
to take advantage of the new technology. This expansion of electronic commerce is 
compelling changes in contract law. 
There are two types of contracts that can be entered into online. The first type 
concerns the delivery of products or services outside the computer system, while the 
second type relates to subject matter that resides within one or more computer systems. 
These agreements, contracted for and performed· online, are created through the use of 
electronic agents. Currently, contracts that relate to products deliverable outside the 
computer may be covered by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) while contracts that 
are completed totally by computer may not be covered. The major issue is whether 
computer contracts should be governed by the UCC or by some other uniform statute.2 
Other important issues that must be addressed include: whether an electronic contract 
satisfies the Statute of Frauds; whether the writing can be authenticated; and the validity 
of the use of digital signatures. 
In this paper, we will consider: (1) the Statute of Frauds, authentication of the 
writing, and the use of digital signatures; (2) applicability of the UCC to electronic 
contracts, (3) Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), (4) the 
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000, (5) the potential 
impact of the passage of these statutes on electronic contracts, and (6) Shrink-Wrap 
and Click Wrap licenses. 
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